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Summary
Th e war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
the most demanding issue in any analysis 
of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the creation 
of new states in Southeast Europe. Called 
“Miniature Yugoslavia” by some, the cen-
tral Yugoslav republic is a national heri-
tage of three peoples: the Bosniaks (called 
Muslims till September 1993), Croats, and 
Serbs. Th ere is no consensus among these 
three peoples about the cause, character, or 
even the starting date of the war. Th e con-
fl ict between the Croats and the Muslims, 
which was also the central part of the war 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, remains the 
subject of the greatest controversy in this 
context.
Th e war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a continuation of the wars in Slo-
venia and Croatia, which were provoked by Serbs, and waged by the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (Jugoslavenska narodna armija – JNA) acting in their interests. 
As was the case in Croatia, these Serbs began working towards their war goals 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina using paramilitary formations and the Serbian 
part of the Territorial Defence, which were soon supported by the JNA. With 
Croatian assistance, the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina achieved major 
military successes in the Bosnian Posavina and the Neretva Valley in Mar-
ch and April 1992, thanks to which Bosnia and Herzegovina survived JNA 
attacks in April, before the latter’s formal disbandment in May 1992. Th ese 
victories allowed armed Croat units in other areas, such as the valleys of the 
Vrbas and Lašva Rivers, to play a key role in repulsing Serbian attacks. In 
1993, on the parts of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were defen-
ded by Croatian forces, or where Croatian forces had helped secure the basic 
conditions for mounting an eff ective defence, the Muslims initiated a war and 
ethnic cleansing of the Croats.
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Th e Muslims pragmatically decided that it is more worthwhile to engage 
in a war against the Croats than to continue the war against the Serbs. Th e Ser-
bian forces had the advantage all along the front, while the Muslims and the 
Croats were intermixed without a clear boundary line. Th erefore, the strategic 
decision was easy to make. Th e fact that the Croats and Muslims had the same 
enemy in 1992 did not serve as a basis for building a harmonious relationship, 
let alone an alliance – it was impossible since they had diff ering political views 
on the current situation and future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, the 
Serbs were politically closer to the Croats because they opposed centralism, 
which was favoured by the Muslims. It was a political confl ict between a desi-
re for an entity and a unitarian state, which the Muslims managed to present 
as a civil option to a receptive part of the international community. In a poli-
tical game with the Croats, Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović merely principally 
implemented the guidelines of the programme presented at the September 
1990 election campaign and the meeting held in Velika Kladuša, where he sta-
ted that there are only two options: “civil republic” or “civil war”. He was even 
clearer at the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in February 1991, when he declared that he would “sacrifi ce peace” for a sove-
reign Bosnia, but “wouldn’t sacrifi ce a sovereign Bosnia for peace in Bosnia”. 
Th ese words are the logical conclusion of the views of a person who wrote the 
Islamic Declaration twenty years earlier. Th ey are a strategic baseline without 
which it is impossible to understand the Muslim-Croatian war. Th ese views 
meant that a war between the Croats and the Muslims was unavoidable and, 
analysing the relations in 1992, it is obvious that this was the decision of the 
Muslim leadership. Instead of diplomacy, the Muslim leadership decided to 
build a “civil republic” through force of arms. Th e Muslim-Croat war was 
set into motion by the decision to, immediately aft er the formation of the 3rd 
Corps, bring the greater part of an Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija 
BiH – ABiH) brigade, composed of Muslim refugees from Jajce fi t for mili-
tary service, to the Vrbas Valley. In addition to upsetting the military status 
quo, it threatened Makljen Pass, the most important strategic object supervi-
sed by the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane – HVO). It is at 
this spot that central Bosnia and the Vrbas Valley were cut off  from a part of 
the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, which bordered the Republic of 
Croatia. It is also a point from which troops can be easily channelled towar-
ds Prozor and the Neretva Valley. Th e Croats only began to understand that 
they’re at war in mid-April 1993, when Muslim forces attacked HVO forces 
in Konjic in April 1993, and it soon became apparent that this is no isolated 
incident aft er which the situation would return to normal. What followed was 
a war for territory, characterised by a series of war crimes and expulsions of 
the local population, in which the Croats committed less crimes, but suff ered 
more as a people.
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Th e Muslims gained more from the confl ict that the Croats, and therefore 
present the war as a necessary act. In February 1994, General Rasim Delić 
summarised the point and the eff ect of the war by stating that the “HVO was 
eliminated from the areas of Jablanica, Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj, Zenica, Trav-
nik, and Bugojno. Th at is, an entire province according to the Vance-Owen 
Plan, centred in Travnik”. Delić’s self-praise lays bare the motives and goal of 
the war the ABiH waged against the HVO. Th e ABiH fought for a territory 
that it for the most part managed to ethnically cleanse. It won in ethically mi-
xed areas, where the demography had been changed in favour of the Muslims 
before the outbreak of open confl ict. Th e second characteristic of its success 
was the lack of a continuous dividing line within the confl ict zones; instead, 
there existed a series of mixed ethnic pockets, where its numerical superiority 
allowed it to achieve victory. In areas where a dividing line was established, 
neither the ABiH nor the HVO achieved any major success. Neretva, an ope-
ration conducted by the ABiH in the Neretva and Vrbas Valleys in September 
1993, resulted in failure, as did Buna, an operation carried out by the HVO in 
the Vrbas Valley in November 1993. Th e attempts of the ABiH to take control 
of the Lašva Valley and the town of Žepče also met with failure. With minor 
reinforcements from Croatia in August 1993, the HVO consolidated and, des-
pite occasional crises, particularly in September 1993, gradually took over the 
initiative in Rama and the Lepenica, Neretva, and Vrbas Valleys. In Decem-
ber 1993 and January 1994, the HVO in the Lašva Valley managed to survi-
ve the attacks of the numerically several times superior ABiH only through 
maximum eff ort. Th e failed attacks threatened the total collapse of the ABiH 
3rd Corps. Due to this military failure, Izetbegović agreed to the Washington 
Agreement and thus the war came to an end. R. Delić’s claim that the “Croa-
tian aggressor” was brought into “a hopeless position and was threatened with 
total defeat, and therefore an honourable exit for Croatia and Bosnian Croats 
was found – the conclusion of an agreement to cease hostilities in February 
1994” is therefore unfounded.
Th e book is mostly based on documents of the belligerent sides in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, most of which have been published and are available to all 
Internet users. Despite the immeasurable mass of interpretations of the collap-
se of Yugoslavia, this sort of work has been completely ignored. Th e image I 
have reconstructed can be simplifi ed thus: the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was a war of three constitutional peoples for a territory of which the Croats 
demanded little, the Serbs considerably more, and the Muslims its entirety. In 
trying to achieve their goals, members of each of the three peoples committed 
crimes against members of the other two. What the belligerent sides have in 
common is that they desired more than what was rational and within the 
realms of possibility and, as the war spread, these “wish lists” were expanded 
by eff orts to reduce the population of the other two peoples on this territory 
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as much as possible. While this was common to all actors of the war, this do-
esn’t mean that their roles and actions were equal. Th eir responsibility for the 
war is not equal, and neither is the scale of the crimes committed against the 
members of the other two peoples. Th e fact that someone is better armed and 
has committed the greatest number of crimes doesn’t necessarily mean that 
they are the absolute culprit, and none of the three sides has the exclusive right 
to interpret the war. However, it has become common practice to allow only 
the Bosniaks, who are considered the greatest victims, to exercise this right. 
In doing so, the fact that both Serbs and Croats were interested in negotiations 
about drawing up internal boundaries – which couldn’t take place without the 
participation of the Muslims – is completely ignored. Instead, Bosniak inter-
preters today present a picture of the war as being arranged by Tuđman and 
Milošević in Karađorđevo with the goal of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Th is is indeed the simplest way to shift  the responsibility for the war to others 
and allow the Bosniaks self-amnesty from a series of poor decisions and the 
disorganisation with which they met the war.
I believe that, in this book, I have shown that the war in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina as well as the relations between the Croats and Muslims, i.e. Cro-
atia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, are more complex than those off ered by 
instant-interpreters who believe that their position of contemporaries of the 
war is suffi  cient for grand and far-reaching conclusions that nobody is allowed 
to question.
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